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INTRODUCTION

Picture the following three television advertisements. In the first,
draped with jewelry, an outstretched hand rises slowly out of the
ocean. The scene switches to a man wearing scuba gear who breathlessly yells, "'If you're in over your head because of bad debts or
inflation, call the legal clinic, and we'll take care of your problems.
We'll put you through bankruptcy for $100.' " In the second ad, two
adults on tricycles pedal furiously. A screech and a crash are heard as
the trikes collide and overturn. An attorney appears on the screen
and says, "'Accidents and injuries are no laughing matter. If you've
been injured, you need legal protection. Call me for a free consultation.' "2 In the final ad, a man is shown strapped to an electric chair.
J.D., Vanderbilt University; Attorney, Schreeder, Wheeler & Flint, Atlanta, Georgia.
LL.B. University of Mississippi; LL.M. The George Washington University. Professor of Law, University of Mississippi School of Law. The authors are father and daughter.
1. Marcotte, 'Have I Got a Deal For You', 72 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1986, at 24, 24.
2. Id.
*
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Just as the switch is thrown, a neon sign lights up saying, "I should've
called the law firm of...
Welcome to the world of television advertising, one of the most
controversial issues of the decade for the legal profession.4 With the
liberalization of the advertising restrictions once placed on attorneys,
the fad of television advertising has caught on like wild fire. Since
1977, when the United States Supreme Court opened Pandora's box
to lawyer advertising, 5 the trend has grown dramatically. 6 The once
traditional business card approach has been replaced with a variety of
techniques. Lawyers advertise through direct mail, television, radio,
telephone yellow pages, billboards, newspapers, and magazines.
The controversy today is not over whether lawyers can advertise,
but how they advertise. With the question of legalization over,7 the
queries now address ethical considerations and the eyebrow raising
question, "What is good taste?"'
While the legal profession is significantly concerned with the danger of advertisements misleading potential clients, lawyers are also
concerned about the tactics and antics of the advertising attorney because of the possible harm to the reputation of the legal profession
due to tasteless, crass ads circulated among the non-legal public.9
From advertising, the public is more aware of the commercial quest
for profits and revenues by attorneys than of the numerous pro bono
and public service activities the legal profession provides. The average citizen uses the services of an attorney only once or twice during a
lifetime.10 Outside of that limited contact, the public, in part, forms
its impression of the bar from the advertising it sees and hears. This
limited contact serves as a basis for placing stringent regulations on
3. See Bogutz, ABA Advertising Commission: The Search For Guidelines, THE COMPLEAT LAWYER, Fall 1987, at 23.

4. Comment, The Status of Lawyer Advertising in Virginia: What is Good Taste?, 19 U.
RICH. L. REV. 629, 640 (1985).
5. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (outright prohibition of
lawyer advertising unconstitutional). See generally Messing, The Latest Word on Solicitation,

60 FLA. B.J., May 1986, at 17.
6. See Bogutz, ABA Advertising Commission: The Search For Guidelines, THE COM-

PLEAT LAWYER, Fall 1987, at 23.
7. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 384.
8. See Reiter, Advertising: You Have the Right-Don't Abuse It, FLA. B.J., Apr. 1987, at

4, 4, 25.
9. Id. at 4. See also Vernon, Commercialism Versus Professionalism, 34 N.C. ST. B.Q. 12,

13-14 (1987).
10. See id.
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advertising if the bar wants to prevent the deterioration of professionalism among lawyers."
This controversial issue of what is good taste includes the question
of just how far ads can go before crossing the line of prohibited solicitation. While lawyers may advertise, solicitation is still banned in
some forms.' 2 But the question, "When do some of the most creative
and artful advertisements cross that line and take on a form of prohibited solicitation?" is difficult to answer and is just one of many currently surrounding the legal profession. This article traces the
historical background of legal advertising, focusing on the particular
issue of television ads. This aspect of legal communication with the
public has been avoided purposely by some courts and addressed in
but a handful,' 3 with many questions left unanswered. Those lingering questions are discussed below in the context of how legal advertising on television can be regulated and what form the regulation
should take. Finally, this article reviews and answers the rhetorical
question it poses: Are we going to allow ourselves as a learned profession to be placed in the same public viewpoint as the used car salesman, or will we reclaim our reputation as a profession looked upon
with admiration and respect?

11. See id.
12. See Messing, The Latest Word on Solicitation, FLA. B.J., May 1986, at 17, 18-19.
Until recently, the only sure limits on attorney commercial communication included: a prohibition of targeted direct mail; the absolute prohibition of in-person solicitation for profit and
advertisement; and a few limitations on time, place and manner of advertising and solicitation.
Id. However, in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association the United States Supreme Court struck
down, on free speech grounds, a state rule that effectively prohibited lawyers from soliciting
legal business by sending nondeceptive letters to a targeted group of potential clients, i.e., those
known to be in need of the particular service being promoted by the letters. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association 486 U.S. 466, 479 (1988).
13. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona the Court specifically avoided the question of electronic advertising when it stated "the special problems of advertising on the electronic broadcast media will warrant special consideration." Bates, 433 U.S. at 384. Bates dealt with
printed (newspaper) advertisements and did not address the issue of television ads. Id.
Not until Committee on ProfessionalEthics v. Humphrey, 377 N.w.2d 643 (Iowa 1985), did
a court specifically and exclusively address the issue of television advertising. The Iowa
Supreme Court ruled that the restrictions on Iowa lawyer television advertising were only
regulations and not blanket prohibitions. Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d at 647. The court allowed
television ads but only if regulated. See id.; see also Matter of Zang, 741 P.2d 267, 279 (Ariz.
1987) (regulations may control false ads and ads should generally be informational only);
Grievance Comm. v. Trantolo, 470 A.2d 228, 234 (Conn. 1984) (reasonable regulation permitted for prevention of false, misleading ads); Petition of Felmeister & Isaacs, 518 A.2d 188 (N.J.
1986) (cautiously regulating use of dramatization in TV ads).
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The ban on legal advertising in America was rooted deep in history.
As early as 1784 the Suffolk County, Massachusetts Bar banned the
solicitation of clients in order to prevent a colonial version of ambulance chasing. 14 However, even with prohibitions, many forms of advertising persisted. For example, Abraham Lincoln ran an
advertisement for his legal services in the August 10, 1838 edition of
the Sangamon Journal.'5 Regulation developed on a state by state
basis. Alabama, the first state with a code of legal ethics, adopted in
1887, permitted newspaper advertising and prohibited only direct solicitation of individuals.' 6
In 1908, the American Bar Association (ABA), for the first time,
recommended rules which banned lawyer advertising.17 What began
as a rule of etiquette, formulated under the theory that everyone knew
the local practitioner, transformed into a rule of ethics. These ABA
rules allowed only the use of ordinary business cards.'" In 1937, the
ABA lifted the ban on newspaper advertising, and, in 1938, it approved the publication of information about law firms in legal directories. 19 The 1970 ABA Code of Professional Responsibility initially
prohibited lawyer advertising, but has since been revised and narrowed. This gradual relaxation of the ban has taken numerous forms
and has resulted in an almost complete lifting of it.20
The United States Supreme Court finally took a position on legal
advertising in 1977 when asked to determine the constitutionality of a
blanket prohibition on lawyer advertising in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.2 1 In this case, two attorneys who operated a legal clinic servicing the needs of lower and middle income clients challenged
Arizona's complete bar to lawyer advertising. Advertising in a local

14. Attanasio, Lawyer Advertising in England and the United States, 32 AM. J. COMP. L.

493, 502 (1984).
15. Id. at 502-03.
16. Id. at 503.

17. Id.
18. Attanasio, Lawyer Advertising in England and the United States, 32 AM. J. COMP. L.
493, 503 (1984).
19. Id.
20. By 1951, attorneys could publish information regarding qualifications, degrees, honors, references, clients regularly represented, and areas of practice. The idea was to provide
information in order to educate the public rather than to generate business. These institutional
ads have since become promotional and have come full realm to include broadcast media. Id.

21. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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newspaper, they offered legal services at "very reasonable fees" and
listed their fees for certain routine matters. The Arizona bar suspended the attorneys for one week, concluding that they had violated
state disciplinary rules which banned all legal advertising. The attorneys appealed the decision, arguing that the disciplinary rules were
22
overly restrictive and violative of the First Amendment.
In a five to four decision the Court found that the two attorneys
presented no extravagant claims and, in fact, provided straight-forward valuable information to the public regarding legal services. The
Court held that truthful advertising of the availability and terms of
"routine" legal services such as the uncontested divorce, the simple
adoption, the uncontested personal bankruptcy and the change of
name was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments against
blanket prohibition by the state. 23 It further concluded that constitutional protections for commercial speech guaranteed an attorney's
right to provide information regarding his or her services to the public, even through paid advertisements.24 However, the Court observed that commercial speech is not accorded the same level of First
Amendment protection as are political speech and other forms of protected expression, and as a result, states need only establish that their
regulations impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place and
25
manner of advertising.
The Court disagreed with the argument that advertising would
have an adverse effect on professionalism. Instead, it found that legal
advertising would aid the profession, assist the public in locating competent counsel, and generally make the public more aware of the
availability of legal services. 26 Further, the Court expressly rejected
the idea that legal advertising would be inherently misleading and undesirably stir up litigation.2 71t also deliberately avoided the issue of
electronic broadcast media advertising,28 leaving that question for a
later date and a later court.
Although the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment's pro-

22.
17, 18.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 357; see also Messing, The Latest Word on Solicitation, FLA. B.J., May 1986, at
See Bates, 433 U.S. at 372.
Id. at 363.
Id. at 384.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 372-78.
Id. at 372, 375-76.
Id. at 384.
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tection of free speech included legal advertising, it did not hold that
legal ads are free from all regulation stating, "Advertising that is false,
deceptive or misleading of course is subject to restraint."29 Because
the involved speech was commercial speech, the Court manifested
limited concern over the fact that it was permitting the regulation of
free expression. 0
After Bates, states could regulate lawyer advertising with less danger of violating the Constitution than would be encountered in regulating some other communications. This is due to the fact that
commercial speech is not accorded the same level of protection as is
given to other forms of expression, such as political speech. Therefore, advertising, being a form of commercial speech, is not subject to
the strict First Amendment protections as are these other forms.
Hence, states may regulate with relatively fewer constitutional fears.
Shortly after the Bates decision, the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of in-person solicitation, in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association .31 The Ohio State Bar Association initiated proceedings against
an Ohio attorney for his personal solicitation of accident victims. The
attorney coercively solicited one automobile accident victim while she
was recovering in the hospital, and he surreptitiously tape-recorded
conversations with the victim's family members as well as with a
friend of the victim who was also injured in the accident. Both victims accepted his offer of representation but later discharged him. He
then attempted to bind them contractually through the taped conversations.32 In affirming an order of indefinite suspension, the Supreme
Court expressed strong disapproval of Ohralik's actions, recognizing
his conduct as an example of the potential for overreaching that is
inherent with in-person solicitation."
The Supreme Court in Chralik held that a state may discipline at29. Id. at 383.
30. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 383. The Court stated,
And any concern that strict requirements for truthfulness will undesirably inhibit spontaneity seems inapplicable because commercial speech generally is calculated. Indeed, the
public and private benefits from commercial speech derive from confidence in its accuracy
and reliability. Thus, the leeway for untruthful or misleading expression that has been
allowed in other contexts has little force in the commercial arena.
Id.
31. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
32. Id. at 448-49.
33. Id. at 468 (court saw inherent need for prophylactic regulation of in-person
solicitation).
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torneys for soliciting in person for pecuniary gain under circumstances likely to pose dangers-dangers that a state has a compelling
interest in and a right to prevent.34 The Ohralik Court declared that
protection of the public from fraud, undue influence, intimidation,
overreaching, and other forms of "vexatious conduct" was a legitimate and important state interest.35
The same day Chralik was decided, the Supreme Court also handed
down its decision in In re Primus.a6 This case involved an attorney
who wrote to a prospective client advising her that free legal assistance was available from a non-profit organization, the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU). 37 The woman eventually turned down the
attorney's offer of representation,3 8 but nonetheless, a formal complaint was filed with the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
Discipline of the Supreme Court of South Carolina charging that
Primus had engaged in "solicitation in violation of the Canons of
Ethics."' 39 Justice Powell, writing for the majority in both Ohralik
and Primus, noted that Primus had not solicited representation for
mere financial gain but, rather, in an associational context and as an
expression of Primus' political beliefs; motives that lie at the heart of
the First Amendment's protections. 4' As a result, the state was held
to a much stricter standard than would generally apply to questions
concerning the regulation of commercial speech. 4' Additionally, the
Court distinguished Primus from Ohralik by stating that in the former
case the attorney's activities did not show the same potential for undue influence, overreaching, misrepresentation or invasion of privacy
as did the attorney's activities in the latter case.42 The Court noted
34. Id. at 464.
35. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 462 (court classfied state interest as legitmate and compelling).
36. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
37. Id. at 414. Primus was a practicing attorney in South Carolina as well as a cooperat-

ing lawyer with the American Civil Liberties Union and had been invited by an officer of the
ACLU to speak at a meeting about illegal government sterilization of pregnant women that
was taking place in the area. At the officer's suggestion, Primus later wrote to a woman in the
audience who had told the officer that she wanted to file suit against the physician who had
sterilized her. Id. at 414-17.
38. Id. at 417.

39. Id.
40. Primus, 436 U.S. at 422; see also Attanasio, Lawyer Advertising in England and the
United States, 32 AM. J. COMp. L. 493, 508 (1984).
41. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 437-39 (Justice Powell held state regulation in Primus to
strict scrutiny, yet found no violation because of basis of communication in First Amendment).
42. Id. at 434-35.
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that the letter sent by Primus imparted information that was material
to the making of an informed decision by the potential client regarding legal representation.43 Therefore, the Court placed this activity
under a much lower degree of constitutional scrutiny, holding that a
state could not constitutionally ban this form of communication."
Just five years after Bates and four years after Ohralik and Primus,
the Supreme Court, with Justice Powell again speaking for the majority, handed down the decision of In re R.M.J..4 The R.MJ. Court
made clear that the states may regulate legal advertising as commercial speech but such regulation is subject to the First and Fourteenth
Amendment requirements that they do so with care and in a manner
no more extensive than reasonably necessary to further substantial
state interests.46
R.M.J. mailed law office announcement cards advertising the opening of his office to a select list of addressees and placed ads in newspapers and the yellow pages identifying the jurisdictions where he was
licensed to practice as well as his areas of expertise." Following the
mailings, the Advisory Committee 48 filed a complaint with the Missouri Supreme Court charging R.M.J. with unprofessional conduct in
violation of the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct, Disciplinary
Rule 2-102(A)(2). 49 R.M.J., in direct conflict with the rule, mailed
43. Id. at 435.
44. Id. at 439.
45. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
46. Id. at 202-07 (even when not misleading, state has power to regulate only to extent
which furthers state's own interests).
47. Id. at 196.
48. The advisory committee is a standing committee for the Supreme Court of Missouri
and is in charge of prosecuting disciplinary proceedings and for giving formal and informal
opinions on the Canons of Professional Responsibility. See id. at 194 n.5 (defining the Missouri Advisory Committee).
49. See R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 197-98. DR 2-102 regulates the uses of professional announcement cards. It allows a lawyer or firm to mail a dignified "brief professional announcement card stating new or changed associates or addresses, change of firm name, or similar
matters." The rule does not permit general mailings, however. The cards must be sent to
"lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends, and relatives." Mo. ANN. STAT. Sup. Ct. R.
4, DR 2-102(A)(2) (Vernon 1981). DR 2-102(A)(2) of the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility reads substantially the same. Effective January 1, 1986, Missouri adopted the
Rules of Professional Conduct, patterned after the ABA Model Rules. Rules 7.1 and 7.2 of
the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct merely prohibit "false and misleading" communications, or those that involve solicitation. Mo. ANN. STAT. Sup. Ct. R. 4 (Missouri Rules of
Professional Conduct) Rules 7.1-.2 (Vernon Supp. 1991). The ABA Model Rules are to the
same effect. The solicitation ban is of dubious constitutional validity. See Messing, The Latest
Word on Solicitation, FLA. B.J., May 1986, at 17, 18-19.
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cards to persons other than fellow lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends and relatives.5" The Court held that where the cards and
information contained therein were not inherently misleading, the dissemination of such information could not be restricted in the absence
of a substantial state interest. 5 ' The Court acknowledged that states
may place reasonable restrictions on advertising and on direct mail
ads that are false, deceptive or misleading,5 2 but held that an absolute
ban on speech which is not "inherently" misleading violates the First
Amendment guaranty of freedom of speech.53 Missouri's ban was,
therefore, found to be inappropriate, overbroad and unenforceable. 54
The fact that Justice Powell, a former ABA President, was chosen
to write the opinion of the Court in R.M.J is significant, as is the
unanimity of the Court in reaching its decision. Four years earlier in
Ohralik and Primus, the Court was divided sharply on the issue of
attorney advertising, with Justice Powell espousing the professionalism concerns of state and national bar associations. But with R.M.J.
the message of the Court is clear: lawyer advertising is with us for the
duration, but will be closely scrutinized in order to protect the
public.55

The Court remained silent on the issue of advertising for the next
three years, allowing states and lower courts time to adjust and to
react to this new liberal position on advertising. In 1985, the Court
spoke again in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the
Supreme Court of Ohio.56 Philip T. Zauderer, an Ohio attorney, ran a
newspaper ad directed at women injured by the Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device (IUD)." The ad contained a line drawing of the
device and asked, "DID YOU USE THIS IUD?" 58 The ad informed
50. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 190, 198 (1982).

51. Id. at 203.
52. Id. at 200; see also Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 383-84 (1977) (upholding states' regulation of inherently deceptive advertisement).
53. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 207 (upholding that state cannot ban speech entirely without also
showing misleading elements).
54. Id. at 204-07.
55. See Maute, ScrutinizingLawyer Advertising and Solicitation Rules Under Commercial
Speech and Antitrust Doctrine, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487, 487-503 (1986) (analyzing doctrines of antitrust and commercial speech with lawyer advertising).
56. 471 U.S. 626 (1984).
57. Zauderer had also run an advertisement regarding persons charged with drunk driving for which disciplinary rule violations were alleged, but the Court was concerned primarily
with the Dalkon Shield advertisement. Id. at 629-30.
58. Id. at 630-31.
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women of the harmful effects of the IUD and advised potential clients
to "not assume it is too late to take legal action against the Shield's
manufacturer." 59 Zauderer received over two hundred responses to
the ad and initiated suits on behalf of one hundred and six of the
women who contacted him." The Office of the Disciplinary Counsel
charged Zauderer with violating Ohio's rules limiting permissible illustrations, rules regarding contingent fee disclosures, and rules pertaining to soliciting legal business through advertisements containing
legal advice.6 '
The Court, restating its now well established position on legal advertising, held that since the information contained in the advertisement was neither false nor misleading, Ohio had the burden of
showing a substantial state interest in order to prohibit this form of
legal promotion.62 The Court held that the concerns present in
Ohralik, also an Ohio case, were not present in Zauderer due to the
fact that Ohralik involved in-person solicitation and Zauderer involved print advertisement.63 The interests sufficient to ban the inperson solicitation in Ohralik did not serve the same purpose in
Zauderer. The dangers of overreaching, invasion of privacy, undue
influence and outright fraud inherent in Ohralik's face-to-face solicitation, which justified a prophylactic rule prohibiting attorneys from
soliciting business for pecuniary gain, were not present in Zauderer. 4
The Court noted the differentiation between potentially overreaching in-person solicitation and truthful print advertising about the
availability and terms of general legal services.65 In-person solicitation presents a different regulatory problem in that it is "not visible or
otherwise open to public scrutiny."66 Printed ads, on the other hand,
may convey information a little less effectively, but lack the coercive
force that is inherent with the presence of a trained advocate.67
Printed communication gives the potential client more time to reflect
on his or her needs for legal representation or advice and more discre59. Id. at 631.
60. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 632-33.
61. Id.

62. Id. at 641.
63. Id. (Ohralik decision based on difference between in-person and print solicitation).
64. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 641.
65. Id.
66. Id. (citing and quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 466 (1977)).

67. Id. at 642.
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tion in making a choice without being subjected to undue pressures by
the attorney to make a quick "yes or no" decision.6" Thus, the Court
found advertising through print permissible.
In Zauderer, the Court held that the use of illustrations in legal
advertisements served an important communicative function protected by the First Amendment.6 9 As long as the illustration is accurately rendered and is not misleading or deceptive, the picture should
be accorded the same First Amendment protections as other forms of
commercial speech.7 0 The burden is on the state to justify the restriction by proving a substantial state interest which the restriction vindicates through the least restrictive available means. 7 ' Therefore, the
printed advertisement was permitted and Ohio's disciplinary action
against Zauderer for the ad was found to be unreasonable.
On the other hand, the Court did hold that some disciplinary action
against Zauderer was reasonable because he provided partially misleading information regarding contingent fees.72 The Court observed
that the information he published failed to make clear that the client
would have to pay the out of pocket expenses of the litigation if the
suit was lost. 73 Therefore, Ohio's discipline for the omission of this
fact was upheld.7 4

The bottom line of Zauderer is that an attorney cannot be disciplined for soliciting legal business through printed advertisements

68. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642.
69. Id. at 647. The State had argued that the use of illustrations in attorney advertisements created unacceptable risks that the public would be "misled, manipulated, or confused."
The argument continued that the nature of visual advertising makes it difficult to police due to,
inter alia, its effect on the subconscious. See id. at 648.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 647. The Court here was referring to a test formulated in CentralHudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. PublicService Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). That case involved
the regulation of promotional advertising by an electrical utility, but it has been relied on by
numerous courts for the application of a four-part commercial speech test used when addressing the issue of legal advertising. In order to pass constitutional muster, a state's regulation of
the content of advertising must meet the following criteria: (1) the state must assert a substantial interest in regulation; (2) the interference with speech must be in proportion to the interest
served; (3) the restrictions must be narrowly drawn; and (4) the state may apply the regulation only to the extent that the regulation furthers the state's substantial interest. See Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-66.
72. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650. The advertisement read, in part, "If there is no recovery, no legal fees are owed by our clients." The Court recognized that a layman might not
distinguish between fees and costs. Id. at 652.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 653.
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when the ads contain truthful and nondeceptive information and legal
advice because the state lacks a substantial interest in prohibiting the
ads.
Subsequent cases in other jurisdictions addressed the issue of direct
mail solicitation. Three decisions in particular, In re Von Wiegen,"
Adams v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of the
77
Supreme Court ofIllinois, 76 and Leoni v. The State Bar of California,

dealt with state prohibitions against targeted direct mail advertisements soliciting legal business. Following the rules established from
Bates to Zauderer, the courts held that an absolute ban on direct mail
solicitation violated a lawyer's right of commercial expression under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 7 The threats inherent in
Ohralik, such as undue influence and overreaching, did not justify an
absolute ban on direct mail advertising.7 9 The state courts saw no
difference in the distribution of mail to the public-at-large or to a
targeted audience.8 0 The individual's freedom of choice and opportunity for reflection were preserved intact.8 " However, the courts reaffirmed their prohibitions against advertisements that were false,
misleading and/or deceptive, but held a total ban on direct mail ads
unconstitutional.8 2 The Leoni court, in a prophetic statement, held
that "lawyers cannot be 'totally prohibit[ed]' from 'all future mass
advertising' to a targeted audience." 3
Leoni's prophecy was borne out in 1988 with the decision of Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association, 4 where the United States Supreme
Court stated the issue as being, "Whether a State may, consistent with
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, categorically prohibit lawyers
from soliciting legal business for pecuniary gain by sending truthful
and nondeceptive letters to potential clients known to face particular
75. 470 N.E.2d 838 (N.Y. 1984).
76. 617 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
77. 704 P.2d 183 (Cal. 1985).
78. See Messing, The Latest Word on Solicitation, FLA. B.J., May 1986, at 17, 20-22
(although targeted mail is step higher than newspaper advertising, it doesn't violate personal
privacy like in-person solicitation).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. (risk of overreaching not present as much in printed materials as in in-person).
82. Messing, The Latest Word on Solicitation, FLA. B.J., May 1986, at 17, 20-22 (quoting

Leoni v. State Bar of California, 704 P.2d 183, 195 (Cal. 1985)).
83. Id.
84. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
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legal problems.""5 Shapero, a member of the Kentucky Bar, had applied to the commission charged with regulating attorney advertising
in that state seeking "approval of a letter he proposed to send 'to potential clients who have had a foreclosure suit filed against them.' "I6
While the letter was not found to be false or misleading, approval was
denied on the ground that a Kentucky Supreme Court rule prohibited
the mailing of written advertisements to targeted audiences, as distinguished from the public in general.8 7
The Court observed that efficiency was the reason for sending advertisements to those known to be in need of the service, and that the
First Amendment does not permit a ban on particular speech merely
because it is more efficient.8 8 The Kentucky Bar Association argued
that solicitation was barred by Ohralik and that this case was merely
"Ohralik in writing."8 9 However, the Court saw a significant difference in face-to-face solicitation and solicitation by mail, in that the
latter poses much less risk of overreaching or undue influence than
does the former, and in that a letter may be readily discarded by the
recipient. 9° The Court did not completely rule out the regulation of
direct mail solicitation of targeted groups, but noted that it could be
done "through far less restrictive and more precise means." 9 '
The direct mail solicitation of business directed to a targeted group
is not without its risks, however. Some lawyers in Memphis, Tennessee regularly check the dockets of the criminal courts seeking names,
addresses and charges as they relate to potential clients. They then
write these individuals, noting the pending criminal actions and offering their services in the matter. In one situation, according to an article in a Memphis newspaper, 92 two "well-to-do" businessmen were
arrested for soliciting prostitutes and were sent the usual letters of
solicitation. The wife of one of the businessmen apparently opened a
letter from one of these attorneys, an event that resulted in severe
discomfort for the prospective client. The other businessman, having
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 468.
Id. at 469.
Id. at 469-70.
Shapero, 486 U.S. at 473.

89. Id. at 475.
90. Id. at 475-76 (recipient of advertisement may simply look away).
91. Id. at 476 (court offers solution of having attorneys filing mailing with state agency,
allowing ample opportunity for review).
92. Buser, Lawyers Clash Over Sales Pitches, COMMERCIAL APPEAL, June 10, 1990, at
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some idea of what these attorneys were doing and knowing his mailman, arranged to have the letters pulled until he could get them himself. For this type of solicitation, a lawyer might be in danger of a
lawsuit, or worse!
Shapero, Zauderer, Von Wiegen, Adams, and Leoni all contributed
to the shrinking list of limitations on lawyer advertising. The only
definite limitations enunciated by the Court on the promotion of legal
services include: an absolute prohibition on in-person solicitation for
pecuniary gain; the requirement of complete truthfulness in solicitation and ads; and some limits on time, place, and manner of ads and
solicitation.93
As a prelude to a discussion of television advertising, consideration
must be given to the ABA and its stated position on lawyer advertising in general. In 1983, the ABA adopted the most recent provisions
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules), which supercede
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), adopted in
1969. 94 The relevant provisions of the former, Rules 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3,
address lawyer advertising and solicitation by regulating the dissemination of information about legal services and what a lawyer may and
may not do in communicating information to the public.9 5 The regulations enumerate standards for the attorney regarding services, ad-

93. See Messing, The Latest Word on Solicitation, FLA. B.J., May 1986, at 17, 22.
94. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1989). It must be noted that neither the ABA Model
Code nor the ABA Model Rules are binding on the individual states. Each state is free to
adopt whatever disciplinary rules it chooses to follow, and is not limited to those proposed by
the American Bar Association.
95. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 7.1-.3 (1989). Model Rule 7.1
states:
A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the
lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it:
(a) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to
make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading;
(b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve, or
states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct or other law; or
(c) compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services, unless the comparison
can be factually substantiated.
Id. Rule 7.1. Model Rule 7.2 states:
(a) Subject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may advertise services
through public media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other
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vertising, and making direct contact with prospective clients. 96 Other
important provisions, Rules 7.4 and 7.5, answer the question of
whether a lawyer may communicate information to the public regarding particular fields of law in which he or she practices.9 7 The rules
also regulate the use of firm names and letterheads.
The rules reiterate the holdings of Bates and the cases that fol-

periodical, outdoor advertising, radio or television, or through written or recorded communication.
(b) A copy or recording of an advertisement or communication shall be kept for two
years after its last dissemination along with a record of when and where it was used.
(c) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer's services, except that a lawyer may pay the reasonable cost of advertisements or
communications permitted by this rule and may pay the usual charges of a not-for-profit
lawyer referral service or other legal service organization.
(d) Any communication made pursuant to this Rule shall include the name of at least
one lawyer responsible for its content.
Id. Rule 7.2. Model Rule 7.3 states:
(a) A lawyer shall not by in-person or live telephone contact solicit professional employment from a prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's
pecuniary gain.
(b) A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment from a prospective client by
written or recorded communication or by in-person or telephone contact even when not
otherwise prohibited by paragraph (a), if:
(1) the prospective client has made known to the lawyer a desire not to be solicited
by the lawyer; or
(2) the solicitation involves coercion, duress or harassment.
(c) Every written or recorded communication from a lawyer soliciting professional employment from a prospective client known to be in need of legal services in a particular
matter, and with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, shall
include the words "Advertising Material" on the outside envelope and at the beginning
and ending of any recorded communication.
(d) Notwithstanding the prohibitions in paragraph (a), a lawyer may participate with a
prepaid or group legal service plan operated by an organization not owned or directed by
the lawyer which uses in-person or telephone contact to solicit memberships or subscriptions for the plan from persons who are not known to need legal services in a particular
matter covered by the plan.
Id. Rule 7.3.
96. Id.
97. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 7.4-.5 (1989). Rule 7.4 restricts a
lawyer's ability to "state or imply" that he is a specialist except in the fields of patent and
admiralty law. Id.; see also, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-105(A)
(1980). These rules will undoubtedly be amended somewhat in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Peel v. Attorney Registrationand DisciplinaryComm 'n of Illinois, - U.S. -, 110 S.
Ct. 2281, 2292-93, 110 L. Ed. 2d 83, 100 (1990), which held that a lawyer could not be prohibited from putting on his letterhead that he was a "Certified Trial Specialist By the National
Board of Trial Advocacy." The Court found that this was neither actually nor inherently
misleading. Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2293, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 101.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

15

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 23 [2022], No. 2, Art. 2

ST. MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 23:331

lowed, which prohibit false or misleading communications concerning
legal services.98 The Disciplinary Rules (DRs), a part of the code,
provide more detailed regulations on advertising than do the rules. 99
The DRs specify twenty-five categories of information that may be
disseminated and require, additionally, that information be presented
in a dignified manner.'0° Both the code and rules provide a list of
permissible modes of communication that lawyers may use to advertise their services.' 0 ' At the same time, both prohibit the lawyer giving anything of value to a person recommending his or her services. 102
Rule 7.3 prohibits the direct solicitation of clients for profit. 103 The
98. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1 (1989) (prohibiting false
and misleading statements in advertisements).
99. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(A)-(B), 2-103,
2-104 (1980). DR 2-101(A) states, "A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his partner,
associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, use or participate in the use of any
form of public communication containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim." Id. DR 2-101(A).
DR 2-101(B) states:
In order to facilitate the process of informed selection of a lawyer by potential consumers
of legal services, a lawyer may publish or broadcast, subject to DR 2-103, the following
information in print media distributed or over television or radio broadcast in the geographic area or areas in which the lawyer resides or maintains offices or in which a significant part of the lawyer's clientele resides, provided that the information disclosed by the
lawyer in such publication or broadcast complies with DR 2-101(A), and is presented in a
dignified manner: ...
Id. DR 2 -101(B) (omitting extensive list of advertisement content requirements).
DR 2-103 regulates the recommendation of professional employment by attorneys. See id.
DR 2 -103. This section forbids an attorney from recommending employment as an attorney
for himself or another or from compensating one for recommending his services or from requesting one to recommend him as an attorney. Id.
DR 2-104 regulates direct contact with prospective clients. See id. DR 2-104. Subject to
certain exceptions, DR 2-104 prohibits a lawyer from accepting employment from a layperson
to whom he has given in-person unsolicited advice that the layperson should obtain legal counsel. Id. The exceptions in DR 2-104(A) permit an attorney to accept employment: (1) from a
close friend, relative, former client, or "one whom the lawyer reasonably believes to be a client;" (2) resulting from public educational programs; (3) recommended by a legal assistance
organization; (4) to speak or write publicly; (5) and to represent members of a class action
litigation. Id. DR 2-104 (a) (1)-(5).
100. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B).
101. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.2 (1989); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) (1980).
102. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 7.2 (1989); MODEL RULES OF

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103 (1980).
103. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1989) (forbidding
any in-person solicitation) with MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2103(A) (1980) (allowing direct solicitation only as governed by advertising boundaries).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol23/iss2/2

16

Champion and Champion: Television Advertising: Professionalism's Dilemma.

1991]

TELEVISION AD VER TISING

abuses present in Ohralik provide the basis of this rule,"°4 which is
designed to prevent undue influence, intimidation and overreachingall dangers inherent in direct contact or face-to-face solicitation. 0 5 It
must be noted that the one-on-one situation does not afford the protections and relief opportunities available with media advertisements.
The danger, therefore, of direct communications crossing into the
zone of prohibited solicitation is much greater. DR 2-104(A) and
Rule 7.3 were promulgated for the purpose of providing guidelines for
the soliciting attorney in order to prevent his or her crossing over into
that prohibited zone.
In 1984, Massachusetts elected to adjust its disciplinary rules in
response to recent United States Supreme Court decisions. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court appointed a special committee to
consider modifying DR 2-103 and DR 2-104. In The Matter of
Amendment to Rule 3:07, DR 2-103, and DR 2-104,106 the court
heeded the committee's recommendations and expanded the scope of
permissible lawyer advertising and written solicitation under the
Code. 0 7 However, the court flatly rejected the recommendation that
in-person solicitation for a fee be allowed in certain situations, holding
that "Direct solicitation of employment for a fee is prohibited. There
'0 8
are no exceptions."'
More recently, the ABA dropped a bid to draft guidelines regulating the "dignity" of lawyer advertising due to pressure from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and several bar groups. 109 The ABA
refused to promulgate any rules, concluding that defining and regulating "dignity" is too subjective and more of a personal opinion."10
Even though DR 2-101(B) mandates that communication about legal
services be dignified, Rule 7.1 has no parallel requirement."' Such a
104. See generally ABA COMMISSION ON ADVERTISING, PROVISIONS OF STATE CODES
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY GOVERNING LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION, Recent Developments 2 (1987).

105. See id. at 4.
106. 495 N.E.2d 282 (Mass. 1986).
107. Id. at 284.
108. Id. at 290. See generally New Ethics Rules Governing Attorney Advertising and Solicitation, 31 BOSTON B.J. 28 (1987).
109. See Pendlebury, ABA Drops Bid to Draft Lawyer Advertising Standards, LEGAL
TIMES, Jan. 5, 1987, at 4, col. 1.
110. Id.
111. Compare MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) (1980)
with MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1 (1989).
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requirement serves no interest recognized by the Supreme Court as a

legitimate basis for the regulation of advertising.1" 2
Putting dignity aside, and possibly we must, 11 3 it would seem that
after Shapero,' I4 the ABA Committee on Attorney Advertising would

feel constrained to relax the rules governing direct mail communication to targeted audiences. It is important to note that the word is
"relax," not "remove."

Even post Shapero rules may, and should,

protect against overreaching, regardless of whether it is the result of
false or misleading statements, or arises otherwise." 5
III. TELEVISION ADVERTISING
Strangely enough, the issue of television advertising is one that
courts in the past have been reluctant to address. This is possibly due
to the difficulty in regulating broadcast advertising when compared to
other forms of communication. Some states, such as Iowa,' 16 have
placed strict regulations on television advertising by limiting what
may be contained in the commercial itself.1 1 7 At present, Iowa is one
of the few states with rigid guidelines."' In the rules and the code,
the ABA has established that advertising through the broadcast media is permissible, as long as the ad is not false or misleading, fraudu112. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 369-70, 383-84 (1977).
113. See In re Felmeister & Isaacs, 518 A.2d 188, 205 (N.J. 1986). The New Jersey Court
noted arguments for and against the validity of the "dignity" standard, but opted to base its
decision on another foundation. It noted the difficulty of applying such a standard, but expressly did not rule out its adoption at some point in the future. Id. See generally G. HAZARD
& W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 512-14 (1985) (cited in Felmeister as stating that the "dignified" requirement is not part of Rule 7.1).
114. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
115. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 434-35 (1978) (stating that targeted mailing still
does not pose as great a risk of overreaching as in-person solicitation).
116. See Committee on Professional Ethics v. Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Iowa
1985). Humphrey, as one of the first cases to litigate the issue of television advertising, placed
strict limitations on these types of ads under the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for
Lawyers (197 1) which contains detailed guidelines that advertising attorneys must follow or be
subject to discipline. Id.
117. For example, the Iowa ethics rules prohibit TV ads which contain background
sound, visual displays, more than a single, nondramatic voice or self-laudatory statements. See
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B)(5) (1980) (Iowa provision
modeled on ABA).
118. See Messing, The Latest Word on Solicitation, FLA. B.J., May 1986, at 17, 17-20.
Florida has considered imposing regulations on television advertising specifically; see also
NAT'L L. J., June 19, 1989, at 3. As of the summer of 1991, the Florida Supreme Court had
taken no action on the matter.
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lent, deceptive, self-laudatory, or an unfair statement or claim, and
provided that the disseminated information stays within the confines
of specified permissible categories." 9 While these provisions appear
very structured and regulatory, realistically, many ads subject to these
restraints can remain within the confines of the regulations while
often offending many persons' sense of good taste and dignity. 20
Very few cases have dealt with television ads. The most notewor21
thy decision is Committee on Professional Ethics v. Humphrey.'
Before discussing Humphrey and its impact on the world of television
advertising, certain other cases must be reviewed with an eye toward
how disciplinary rules can be shaped to effectively regulate lawyer television advertising.
The Connecticut Supreme Court, in Grievance Committee v.
Trantolo,22 held that a blanket ban on television advertising is unconstitutional and that the omission of TV ads in a disciplinary rule as a
permissible means of advertising does not implicitly ban that form of
advertising. 123 The Trantolo law firm ran four different television ads
promoting the services of their firm in varying situations. 24 The Connecticut Grievance Committee filed a complaint alleging that the four
ads violated DR 2-101 of the Connecticut Code of Professional Responsibility, which did not explicitly forbid television ads but, instead,
was limited to printed materials, 125 thus implicitly banning TV ads.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the trial court's finding
that the ads violated DR 2-101 and held that the ambiguity caused by
the omission in the disciplinary rule did not dictate a blanket ban on
television advertising.' 26 The court held that such a ban would be
repugnant to the freedom of speech guarantees embraced by the

119. See Messing, The Latest Word on Solicitation, FLA. B.J., May 1986, at 17, 17-20;
Rule 7.2 (1989).
120. For example, see the ads referred to in the opening paragraph of this article.
121. 377 N.W.2d 643 (Iowa 1985).
122. 470 A.2d 228 (Conn. 1984); see also Grievance Comm. v. Trantolo, 470 A.2d 235
(second bar discipline case involving Trantolo, but not including television advertising).
123. Trantolo, 470 A.2d at 232-34.
124. Id. at 229 n. 1. These advertisements were identified by the trial court as "Divorce
Case," "Accident Case," "Mumbo Jumbo," and "Bankruptcy Case." Id.
125. Id. at 230-31. The Connecticut version of DR 2-101 stated "A lawyer may publish
...information in newspapers, periodicals and other printed publications." Id.
126. Id. at 232-34 (court stated that blanket ban on television advertising was repugnant
to commercial speech doctrine).
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
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United States and Connecticut Constitutions. 127 Following the principles in Bates, the court held that the televised advertisements did
not constitute a per se violation of DR 2-101, and that any reprimand
would have to be based on some other form of violation, such as ads
that were false or misleading.12 The court recognized Connecticut's
interest in the regulation of advertising for legal services, but found a
blanket ban did not promote those interests.1 29 The court further recognized that for many individuals, especially the functionally illiterate, TV and radio are the only means by which they may be informed
about the availability of legal services. 130 The court also stated the
easiest and most obvious sanction against television ads: If the viewing audience finds the ad distasteful or offensive, then it can shun the
services or turn off the TV.131
The New Jersey Supreme Court also addressed the issue of television advertising in Petition of Felmeister & Isaacs,132 a decision which
firmly supports restricting television ads. The court ruled that the
New Jersey version of DR 2-102(A) unconstitutionally hindered free
speech.133 The regulation prohibited the use of any drawings, anima34
tions, dramatizations, music or lyrics in any form of advertisement. 1
The supreme court, on constitutional and public policy grounds,
found that the New Jersey version of the disciplinary rule was too
broad, although it expressed a continuing concern for the potential
impact of television advertising.' 35 Therefore, the court revised the
regulation requiring now that all ads should be predominantly informational and limited restrictions of "no drawings, animations, drama-

127. Trantolo, 470 A.2d at 232 (citing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350

(1977)).
128. Id. at 234.
129. Id. at 233 (state has interest in regulation, but blanket restriction too narrow).
130. Id. at 234 (group without access to printed media is larger than illiterates).
131. Trantolo, 470 A.2d at 234.
132. 518 A.2d 188 (N.J. 1986).
133. Felmeister, 518 A.2d at 189. The New Jersey regulation, Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 7.2(a), stated:
Subject to the requirements of RPC 7.1 [prohibiting false or misleading advertising], a
lawyer may advertise services through public media, such as a telephone directory, legal
directory, newspaper or other periodical, radio or television, or through mailed written
communication. All advertisements shall be presented in a dignified manner without the
use of drawings, animations, dramatization, music or lyrics.
Id. at 188 (quoting the NEW JERSEY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT as of 1984).

134. Felmeister, 518 A.2d at 188.
135. Id. at 189.
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tizations, music, or lyrics" only to television. 36 The court also did
away with an explicit dignity requirement, explaining that a dignity
standard was too difficult to apply.1 37 The court reasoned that a dignity standard could be served through other standards adopted within
the rules with less difficulty in application, such as Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 7.2.131
The court recognized the dangers inherent in unrestricted advertising but found that the benefits outweighed the dangers.1 39 The court
felt that the twin goals of providing consumers with information
about the legal system, and doing so at a lower price, outweighed the
14
reasoning behind a severe restriction on printed communication. 0
Additionally, the court realized that with printed ads, the consumer is
at minimal risk, able to throw the ad away or ignore it. The court
noted that direct solicitation, as in Ohralik, was prohibited for the
same overreaching and influential reasons for which the Ohio court
had imposed sanctions.1 41 For the above reasons, the New Jersey
Supreme Court eased the restrictions on all media except television.
Despite the court's analysis and holding in regard to print media, it
felt that TV ads were still too volatile and unpredictable to be totally
without limits. 4 2 The court felt that many individuals with minimal
access to informed sources on legal services rely heavily on television
136. Id. at 189. The revised RPC 7.2 reads:
Subject to the requirements of RPC 7.1 a lawyer may advertise services through public
media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodical, radio,
or television, or through mailed written communication. All advertisements shall be
predominantly informational. No drawings, animations, dramatizations, music, or lyrics
shall be used in connection with televised advertisements. No advertisement shall rely in
any way on techniques to obtain attention that depend upon absurdity and that demonstrate a clear and intentional lack of relevance to the selection of counsel; included in this
category are all advertisements that contain any extreme portrayal of counsel exhibiting
characteristics clearly unrelated to legal competence.

Id. at 208.
137. Petition of Felmeister & Isaacs, 518 A.2d 188, 205 (N.J. 1986) (court stated the
standard was difficult to apply and that the results could be achieved by other methods).
138. Id. In the same breath, the court acknowledged that even though an explicit dignity

standard was unnecessary, it did not violate First Amendment protections nor fall before voidfor-vagueness challenges. The court felt such a standard would be too difficult to apply in

every case, but did leave open the possibility of the same standard being adopted in the future.
Id.
139. Id. at 188-95.
140. Id. at 192.
141. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978) (court found that inperson solicitation had great risk of overreaching.)
142. Petition of Felmeister & Isaacs, 518 A.2d 188, 195, 201 (N.J. 1986) (court found
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for information, and that this generally less affluent and less well educated group should, therefore, be protected against the dangers inherent with television ads.' 4 3 Such individuals are the most vulnerable to
the kind of advertisement whose attention-getting technique depends
upon shock value, where the more absurd the ad, the more attention it
gets. 44 The court realized that this form of ad is structured to
demonstrate that the particular attorney is willing to take on the case
rather than emphasize the attorney's skill and competence.1 45 Shock
and absurdity are effective and unfortunately grab the attention of the
viewing audience, especially an audience with limited access to information about legal services. Due to this potential danger, the court
felt that restrictions on TV ads are necessary in order to protect the
146
vulnerable public.
An additional revision to New Jersey's Rule on lawyer advertising
stated:
No advertisement shall rely in any way on techniques to obtain attention that depend upon absurdity and that demonstrate a clear and
intentional lack of relevance to the selection of counsel; included in this
category are all advertisements that contain any extreme portrayal of
characteristics clearly unrelated to legal
counsel exhibiting
47
competence. 1
This revision, the court concluded, while more narrow than the dignity standard, serves the same purpose and is easier to apply. 148
Finally, the court ruled that all ads must be predominantly informational so "in both quantity and quality, the communication of factual
information rationally related to the need for and selection of an attorney predominates."' 149 This provision requires advertising attorneys to emphasize their competence and skill, rather than just rely on
the shock value of the ads.' 5 °

that nature of electronic broadcast media was more capable of misleading because of audience
at which it is aimed).
143. Id. at 195.
144. Id. at 196 (court noted that "shock" ad would not appeal to serious viewer).
145. Id.
146. Petition of Felmeister, 518 A.2d at 195, 201.
147. Id. at 208 (revised RPC 7.2).
148. Id. at 205.
149. Id. at 194.
150. Undaunted, the attorneys then challenged the revised rules in federal court on constitutional grounds. The court dismissed on grounds of ripeness, or, more accurately, the lack
thereof. Felmeister v. Office of Attorney Ethics, 856 F.2d 529, 530 (3rd Cir. 1988).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol23/iss2/2

22

Champion and Champion: Television Advertising: Professionalism's Dilemma.

1991]

TELEVISION AD VER TISING

The New Jersey Supreme Court's holding is well-founded. As the
court implies, television advertising by attorneys is relatively new to
society and any changes in restrictions should be approached conservatively. However, a sweeping ban is too hasty. Time, the court
recognized, is the only way to tell what restrictions should be lifted
with regard to the world of television advertising. 1 '
In Matter of Zang, 52 which involved an unusual fact situation, the
Arizona Supreme Court examined television advertisements in the
narrow context of whether they were false and misleading" 5 3 -a topic
thus far rarely addressed by courts in the context of television. The
attorneys involved ran four print and nine video ads which appeared
in the Phoenix, Arizona viewing area between 1982 and 1983.1"1 In
particular, the TV ads (1) were overly dramatic, (2) featured an authoritative-sounding narrator, and (3) contained either frenetic or
peaceful music as background for the drama. 55 Each ad ended with a
climactic scene showing one of the attorneys arguing in court before a
jury. The viewer generally was situated behind the jury box.1 56
The Arizona Supreme Court, citing Zauderer and Felmeister, held
that the TV ads were inherently misleading and potentially dangerous.1" 7 The court found that the ads portrayed the law firm as ready
and willing to take a case to trial, when in actuality, the law firm,
founded in 1979, had never had an attorney try a personal injury case
to its conclusion' 5 8 and, instead, consciously followed a policy of
avoiding trials in favor of settlement. 5 9 As a result, the court found
that the attorneys had no intention of taking a case to trial as portrayed and, consequently, that their representations as to their courtroom abilities were false, misleading and untruthful. 16°

151. Petition of Felmeister, 518 A.2d at 195.
152. 741 P.2d 267 (Ariz. 1987).
153. Zang, 741 P.2d at 273-76.
154. Id. at 273.
155. Id. at 274. The scenes displayed on the advertisements were, for example, pictures
of an automobile accident, a worried couple in a hospital waiting room, or a father kissing his
daughter good-bye for, what appears to be, the last time. Id.
156. Zang, 741 P.2d at 274.
157. Id. at 277 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 652-53 and Petition of Felmeister & Isaacs, 518 A.2d 188, 195, 201) (N.J.
1986).
158. Id. at 275.
159. Id.
160. Zang, 741 P.2d at 276 (referring to the court record at 22-23).
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The attorneys argued that the ads did not harm anyone, but the
court rejected this argument as unpersuasive. 6 ' It found that even if
no client was harmed, discipline was necessary to protect consumers
from misleading advertising.' 62 The court cited Felmeister, recognizing that many of the previously discussed concerns addressed by that
court were present in Zang.163 The two attorneys involved in the ads
were suspended, one for one year and the other for thirty days.'6
The most crucial decision thus far on television advertising is Committee on Professional Ethics v. Humphrey. 6 ' In 1985, the Iowa
Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a state, in light of
the recent United States Supreme Court holding in Zauderer, was
constitutionally permitted to restrain attorneys from advertising on
television. 66 It answered the question affirmatively and issued a writ
167
restraining the attorneys involved.
There were actually two Humphrey decisions with the first opinion
rendered in September of 1984.168 The unsuccessful defendants appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court, where certio6
rari was pending when the Court filed its decision in Zauderer. 1
Then the United States Supreme Court vacated the Iowa Supreme
Court's judgment and remanded the matter back to that court for
further consideration in light of Zauderer.7 °
The Iowa court felt that the decision in Zauderer was limited to
print advertisements and could not fairly be extended to the electronic
media.'' The court stated that the "strongest basis for concluding
the Zauderer rationale has no impact on electronic media advertise-

161. Id. at 277.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 279; see Petition of Felmeister & Isaacs, 518 A.2d 188, 199 (N.J. 1986).
164. Zang, 741 P.2d at 288.
165. 377 N.W.2d 643 (Iowa 1985).
166. See Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d at 644.
167. Id. at 647.
168. See Committee on Professional Ethics v. Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Iowa
1984) (the first Iowa Supreme Court decision in this matter).
169. See Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d at 644.
170. Humphrey v. Committee on Professional Ethics, 472 U.S. 1004, 1004 (1984). Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor would have noted probable jurisdiction. Id. at 1004.
171. See Humphrey v. Committee on Professional Ethics, 377 N.W.2d 643, 644-47 (Iowa
1985). The ZaudererCourt, in a nutshell, held that printed advertisements, which are not false
and misleading, or overreaching, cannot be proscribed through state regulations. Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647-649 (1985).
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ments is that we have the Supreme Court's word for it,"'1 72 referring
to the United States Supreme Court's holding in Bates 173 which acknowledged the "special problem " inherent in the world of electronic
advertising. 174 These "special problems" afforded the United States
Supreme Court the escape it needed in order to avoid discussing or
considering television advertising.'M The Iowa Court relied on the
decision in Zauderer,coupled with the United States Supreme Court's
express abstention from considering electronic media in Bates, to conclude that a strict regulation of TV advertising does not violate consti176
tutional freedoms.
In discussing the rationale behind such a ban, the court stated, first,
that Iowa had a substantial governmental interest in regulating perceived potential abuses. 1 7 7 The court analogized TV advertising and
its dangers of overreaching and abuse to the reasons for the prohibition of face-to-face solicitation. 17 1 Second, the court stated that electronic ads involve much less deliberation and consideration by those
to whom they are targeted than do printed ads. 179 With printed ads,
the consumer may read, reread, think, consider and then either make
inquiry or toss away the ad. With TV ads, the consumer is suddenly
exposed to a legal situation flashed on the screen which provides a
phone number and the name of a firm or particular attorney to call in
the event the person is involved in a similar legal situation. The Iowa
Court considered these factors in determining that TV advertising
should be subject to strict regulation, because it leaves little time for
thought or consideration of the attorney's available services, skills, or
competence.1 0 The court also relied on earlier United States
Supreme Court observations that the broadcast media is highly perva-

172. Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d at 645.
173. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
174. Cf. Marlane, Respicis, Aspicis, Prospicis: Lawyer Advertising on Television, 12 TRIAL
DIPL. J. 151, 154 (1989). In explaining why he did not advertise on television, Aaron J.
Broder, who does utilize print advertisements, said, "It's a bit too glitzy for my blood....
Television has a quality of fiction, a quality of nonreality. There is the TV lawyer, the Perry
Mason syndrome." Id.
175. See Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d at 645-46.
176. See id. The Iowa court emphasized the "special problems" inherent with television
advertisements recognized by the United State Supreme Court. Id. at 646.
177. Id. at 646.
178. Id. See also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978). Ohralik held
that face-to-face solicitation was prohibited. Id.
179. See Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d at 646.
180. Id. at 646- 47.
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sive and intrusive. 18 1 Humphrey did not result in a blanket ban, as it
only prohibited television advertising which contains background
sound, visual displays, more than a single nondramatic voice, or selflaudatory statements." 2 With this decision, television ads are still
permitted in Iowa but are subject to these requirements. The holding
provided regulation of a form of advertising regarded as potentially
18 3
ripe for abuse.
The Humphrey case is important because it is currently the most
authoritative case dealing with television advertising. The other cases
discussed have dealt with this legal dilemma in some aspect but have
not addressed the nuts and bolts of why TV advertising should or
should not be regulated extensively. Humphrey is the first case to address this issue thoroughly and decide definitively that television advertising by attorneys should be strictly regulated.
IV.

DISCUSSION

One estimate is that one-fourth of law firms advertise today and,
among younger lawyers, the percentage is higher.18 4 In a poll taken
on November 1, 1987, approximately one-third (thirty-two percent)
of the lawyers queried said that they had advertised their services at
some point in time.'
This result was up eight percent over those
responding in 1985. 86 The one in four that were estimated as advertising in 1987 was up from seventeen percent advertising in 1985.17
Strangely enough, those lawyers advertising on television dropped
188
from seven percent in 1985 to three percent at the time of the poll.
This suggests that lawyers are being overcome by morality and dignity, that TV advertising is not as effective as once thought, or that it
is too expensive. Also, one cannot overlook the reality that the time
span between the two reports is so short that one should not read too
much into these changes. It is also possible that the poll was flawed.
A report compiled by the Television Bureau of Advertising, Inc.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 647 (citing FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978)).
Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d at 643.
Id. at 647.
See Bogutz, ABA Advertising Commission: The Search For Guidelines, THE COMPLEAT LAWYER, Fall 1987, at 23.
185. See Reidinger, Lawpoll, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1987, at 25.
186. Id.
187. Id.

188. Id.
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showed television advertising by lawyers in 1988 to be up by eight
percent over 1987.189 Of course, pressure within the ABA from attorneys who want tasteless and undignified TV ads regulated could have
caused attorneys who advertise to either change their commercials or
find other ways to solicit business. The consensus appears to be that a
majority of lawyers do not necessarily mind TV advertising as long as
the ads are not so crass as to give the profession an overall bad image.
The goal of these attorneys is to maintain dignity and professionalism
within the realm of advertising. 190 Therefore, their concern is not
whether attorneys can advertise, but how they do it.
The individual states are left to regulate attorneys within their jurisdiction.' 9 1 In every state the legislatures or courts have adopted
either the ABA's rules regulating advertising or their own variation of
the rules. 192 According to a recent survey, forty-four states allow
commercials to include dramatizations and graphics and forty-three
permit the use of actors. 193 This is not due to these states promulgating particular rules, but due to the fact that they have not expressly
prohibited these forms of television advertisements. Twenty-one
states have only the restriction that the advertising not be false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive. 194 Approximately fourteen states specifically regulate TV in some manner, requiring either that the ads
conform to certain standards or that the lawyer approve the commercial and maintain copies of it for a specified period of time. 1I" It appears that, since the United States Supreme Court has yet to address
the issue of broadcast advertising, the states are reluctant as well.
Although all states allow television advertising, few have strict guidelines regulating it. 196 Apparently, the states prefer to leave regulation
up to the courts on a case-by-case basis, at least until the Supreme
Court rules on the matter or until the ABA promulgates guidelines,

189. See NAT'L L.J., March 27, 1989, at 6.
190. See Bogutz, ABA Advertising Commission: The Search for Guidelines, THE COMPLEAT LAWYER, Fall 1987, at 23.
191. See generally ABA COMMISSION ON ADVERTISING, PROVISIONS OF STATE CODES
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY GOVERNING LAWYER ADVERTISING
TION, Recent Developments 2 (1987).

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

AND SOLICITA-

See Reidinger, Trends in the Law: Lawyer Ads, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1986, at 78, 78.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Reidinger, Trends in the Law: Lawyers Ads, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1986, at 78, 78.
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neither of which appears likely to happen anytime soon. 97
Since there is no state or federal decision similar to Bates or
Zauderer addressing television advertising, it seems that the profession itself must decide how far these ads may go. The profession as a
whole must discourage offensive and undignified advertising on television through whatever permissible means that are effective. While
legal advertising as commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment
protection, 98 that area of freedom of speech must have reasonable
limitations. Of course, no speech that is materially false, deceptive or
misleading is constitutionally protected,1 99 but it is not so clear that
this is true of speech that strives only to get the viewer's attention in
order to say, "Yes, I am an attorney and I want your business." This
speech is potentially misleading because it does not relay any information to the viewing public regarding that attorney's availability, skills,
or competence.
The entire argument behind allowing unrestricted television advertising revolves around the notion that television ads foster competition2 °° and benefit the public by disseminating information about
attorneys, particularly to people who otherwise would have no access
to it.2"' The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), in strident opposition
to any regulation or restriction of television advertising, urges a competitive and economic argument that advertising lowers the prices of
attorneys' services within areas where attorneys run ads.2 ° 2 These arguments have never been hotly disputed, but the FTC's position that
dignity should not be included as an advertising guideline has been
the subject of controversy.2 °3 Commentators supporting the FTC position argue that dignity is self-regulating because consumers will de-

197. See Pendlebury, ABA Drops Bid to Draft Lawyer Advertising Standards, LEGAL
TIMES, Jan. 5, 1987, at 4, col. 1.
198. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384.
199. Id.; see also Report of the Commission on Professionalism to the Board of Governors
and the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, 112 F.R.D. 243, 276 (1986).
200. See Moss, Law Firms' TV Ad $$ Hiked, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1986, at 19.
201. See Miskiewicz, Ad Debate Lingers, But Its Focus Shifts, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 15, 1986,
at 1, 50.
202. See Moss, Law Firms' TVAd $$ Hiked, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1986, at 19; Pendlebury,
ABA Drops Bid to Draft Lawyer Advertising Standards,LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 5, 1987, at 4, col. 1.

203. See Pendlebury, ABA Drops Bid to Draft Lawyer Advertising Standards, LEGAL
TIMES, Jan. 5, 1987, at 4, col. I (discussing FTC guidelines). See generally At Issue: Is Dignity
Important in LegalAdvertising?, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1987, at 52 (debate on issue of dignity in legal
advertisements).
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termine what are undignified ads and consequently not use that
attorney's services."
On the other side of the coin are the promoters of restrictions on
television advertisements. The main argument in favor of a dignity
standard is generally espoused by lawyers rather than the public.2"'
Proponents of restricting TV advertising argue that: (1) unrestricted
advertising will commercialize the profession and undermine the attorneys' sense of dignity and self-worth, (2) legal services and capabilities are so individualized regarding content and quality that
advertising is inherently misleading as TV ads rarely focus on these
attributes, (3) advertising will stir up litigation, and (4) the quality of
services offered will be inferior, such as that common to attorneys
resorting to "ambulance chasing."2 °"
The drawback to banning television advertising is that individuals
who do need legal advice and who do not know how to obtain it will
be unable to receive information about attorneys' services. Typically,
these individuals are of low income and are less educated, not as able
to avail themselves of the print media, such as newspapers and
magazines. Additionally, these individuals usually perceive lawyers
as rich, powerful people who only represent other rich, powerful people or large corporations. They also believe they cannot afford an
attorney; a belief that is not totally without merit. Unfortunately,
these individuals are completely unaware of the fact that there are
attorneys who will provide affordable services. A restraint on the free
flow of information may hurt not only the attorney in a business sense
but, more importantly, may hurt people with legitimate legal claims.
However, one must balance this interest of publicizing legal services
to the under-privileged against the interest of the profession in keeping the law a profession and not a commercial enterprise. Some argue
that the line drawn between a legal profession and a business is just a
distinction without a difference, contending that a law practice is basically a commercial activity engaged in for pecuniary gain and, thus, a

204. See At Issue. Is Dignity Important in Legal Advertising?, A.B.A. J.,Aug. 1987, at 52;
Miskiewicz, Ad Debate Lingers, But Its Focus Shifts, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 15, 1986, at 1, 50.

205. See Miskiewicz, Ad Debate Lingers, But Its Focus Shifts,
at 1, 50.

NAT'L

L.J., Dec. 15, 1986,

206. See Comment, The Status of Lawyer Advertising in Virginia: What is Good Taste?,
19 U. RICH. L. REV. 629, 640 (1985); see also Comment, Out of the Shadows and Into the
Light: Alabama Adopts New Rules on Attorney Advertising, 37 ALA. L. REV. 787, 802 (1986).
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business. A profession, however, is much, much more. As Webster's
puts it, a profession is:
a calling requiring specialized knowledge and often long and intensive
preparation including instruction in skills and methods.., maintaining
by force of organization or concerted opinion high standards of achievement and conduct, and committing its members to continued study and
to a kind of work which has for its prime purpose the rendering of a
public service.2 °7

Underlying this definition is a standard of dignity based on public
expectations as well as tradition and image. The legal profession has
traditionally been looked upon with respect because of the specialized
knowledge and skill required to be a lawyer. This respect has been
supported through the profession's own high standards of achievement and dignified conduct among its members. This traditional image and internal standard of dignity distinguishes the legal profession
from a mere business. As one commentator stated, "Many ...attorneys look down upon advertising on the theory that 'if it's dignified,
it's a profession; if it's undignified, it's a business.' "o20
However, the discussion about dignity, even though well-founded,
does not solve the problem. The soap box dictum concerned with
maintaining dignity within the profession by regulating television advertisements can be observed as a means to an end, but is the end in
sight? Probably not. Until the proper state authorities or the United
States Supreme Court make a decision to regulate television advertisements, the hucksterism will continue and the "shock" advertisements
that are not false, fraudulent, or misleading will pass muster.
Guidelines that will pass constitutional muster must be designed to
keep offensive ads 2 9 off TV. Admittedly, most individuals can distinguish between dignified and undignified commercials, 2 10 but for those
who cannot, protective measures should be taken. If information regarding legal services is to be disseminated, it should be done in a way

207. See WEBSTER'S 3D NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1811 (3d ed. 1981).
208. See Miskiewicz, Ad Debate Lingers, But Its Focus Shifts, NAT'L. L.J., Dec. 15, 1986,
at 1, 50 (quoting Norton Frickey, president of Denver's Norton Frickey & Assocs., the sixthlargest legal television advertiser).
209. For example, the ads referred to in the first paragraph of this article.
210. See BREAD 'N BUTTER: A LEGAL ECONOMICS PUBLICATION OF THE STATE OF
GEORGIA (Jan. 1990). One poll showed that seventy-two percent of the respondents believed
lawyers were competent until they viewed their television commercials. After that only
twenty-two percent thought so. Id.
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that avoids the "shock" factor and tells the public what they need to
know: the attorney's skill or experience in varying areas of law; proof
of the attorney's competence; evidence of his or her commitment to
the law; fee information; and how the attorney can be contacted. A
thirty second commercial can do this without drama and hype. The
profession wants a prospective client to choose an attorney based on
an attorney's professional ability and not based on who has the better,
more attractive advertising program.
Unfortunately, the courts' hands are tied unless an ad is false or
misleading. The ABA is pinned into a corner as well, because of the
varying views on TV ads and because the states are not required to
adopt the ABA's code or rules. Furthermore, defining dignity is not
an easy task. It is a subjective opinion left up to the individual. As
the chairman of the ABA's Commission on Advertising stated, "Dignity, like pornography, is in the eyes of the beholder."2 1
Therefore, in the absence of judicial guidance, the profession itself
must control television advertising through self-administered means.
This is the key to preserving the profession's image. But just what are
these means? How should they operate? These are obviously difficult
questions to answer. The efforts to control television advertising and
to maintain the profession's image must come from members of the
organized state bar associations. Efforts to. enlighten rulemakers and
practitioners on the evils inherent in unrestrained television advertising are needed to curb the tide of irresponsibility.
Institutionally, the bar associations must provide better information to the consuming public about what it should look for when selecting an attorney. A concerted effort is needed to inform the public
about the attributes it should require in an attorney. More than
likely, the average consumer will be able to distinguish between the
dignified and undignified advertisements, but this does not mean that
he or she will have the sophistication to realize that the catchy commercial did not communicate anything useful. Some guidance is
needed.
Additionally, within the profession itself, bar leaders should inform, represent, lead, and guide their members. Recommendations as
to permissible ads and reprimands for tasteless, undignified ads are
necessary in order to guide advertising attorneys. Information can be
211. See Miskiewicz, Ad Debate Lingers, But Its Focus Shifts,
at 50.
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disseminated through bar newsletters, formal opinion letters and
other similar publications.
The means are available, but without a legislative stamp or court
approval, these means are nothing more than unenforceable guidelines. Nonetheless, they can be beneficial to the efforts to maintain
dignity within the profession. Obviously, the lawyers who choose to
advertise in an undignified manner will be unaffected by these unenforceable guidelines. But it is to be hoped that the lawyers who have
not yet resorted to advertisements, but who are contemplating doing
so, will either elect not to use them, or will do so in a dignified manner, taking the mainstream views and recommendations into consideration. If the members of the profession join forces to regulate
advertisements broadcast statewide, or even nationwide, then the peddlers and hucksters will not be able to destroy the more than twohundred years of respect afforded the legal profession.
V.

CONCLUSION

Former Chief Justice Warren Burger stated, "just because the Constitution permits an act, that does not make it ethically acceptable for
the privileged profession of the law." 2 2 As Mr. Chief Justice Burger's statement intimates, some advertising attorneys have lost sight
of the traditional values of our once highly respected profession. Admittedly, the former Chief Justice does take the issue of advertising to
an extreme by advising the public to never hire an attorney who advertises, 2 3 but his opinion is not totally unwarranted. Members of
the legal community should respect the profession enough to keep the
used car salesman image away from the law. Regulation in the most
pervasive form of media, television advertisements, is essential to protect the profession's image.
Television advertising by lawyers must be regulated by the states
unless some federal agency, such as the F.T.C., provides guidance in
this area.214 Unfortunately, not many states have chosen to act in this
212. Chief Justice Burger made this comment in his final State of the Judiciary Speech to
the opening assembly of the ABA Annual Meeting. See Marcotte, State of the Judiciary: Burger Hits Ads, Fees, Solicitation, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1986, at 22.
213. See Reiter, President'sPage. Advertising: You Have the Right-Don'tAbuse It, FLA.
B.J., Apr. 1987, at 4.
214. Pendlebury, ABA Drops Bid to Draft Lawyer Advertising Standards, LEGAL TIMES,

Jan. 5, 1987, at 4, col. 7 (ABA refusing because to define dignity would be too subjective). At
the moment the F.T.C. does not seem a likely candidate to take the lead in this effort.
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regard. Therefore, the profession itself must act and encourage selfregulation among its members. With the professions's image at stake,
some form of guidance is undeniably needed.
The future of television advertising is somewhat unpredictable.
Until the United States Supreme Court takes a position on the subject,
the states are left to regulate this form of media advertising as they
think best. The tasteless, undignified ads will continue in some jurisdictions while in others, like Iowa, the ads will be strictly regulated
and monitored to keep the legal profession's image respectable.
The fact that fewer attorneys may be advertising on television suggests that self-regulation is already working.2 15 Regardless of whether
it can be demonstrated that the current level of self-regulation is effective, more is needed and should be administered in a highly visible
fashion. Attorneys will continue to advertise on TV as long as it exists. It is to be hoped that the dignity of and respect for the legal
profession can be maintained even in the absence of federal regulation. Attorneys have the right to advertise. Let's just hope that they
do not abuse that right.

215. See Reidinger, Lawpoll, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1987, at 25 (polls show a drop of four percent in just a few years. The numbers were up a total of seventeen percent, however, from
1985 to 1987). Id.
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